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In the present paper Joyce and Razo-Garcia (2011) explore whether there exists a
relationship between the quotas countries enjoy with the IMF and their reserve
policies. In doing so they are asking an interesting question which has until now
been neglected. Their hypothesis is that the built-up of reserve holdings by central
banks is the bigger the lower their quotas and thus the amount of financial support
they could get.
After an introduction Section 2 explains the quota system of the IMF followed by
the presentation of a simple “Model of Quotas and Reserves” in Section 3. It is
assumed that reserves and the amounts available because of the quotas provide
identical benefits, whereas the marginal costs of using the financial means provided
by quotas are increasing in contrast to the constant costs of holding reserves.
Moreover, the marginal costs of using these means are everywhere greater than those
of using reserves as international liquidity. This is the case because of the conditions
imposed by the IMF, “which in the short-run is contractionary if there are nominal
rigidities in the economy.” Here it is not clear to me why according to the model
central banks should ever want to borrow from the IMF, if the marginal costs to do
so are always higher than relying on own reserves.
I will return to this question in the end. Moreover, one might argue that the long-
run should also be considered: Is it not true that the conditions imposed by the IMF
are supposed to lead to a better economic situation for the borrowing country?
In Section 4 “Data and Methodology” are presented. A panel of 24 upper- and 29
middle-income countries is used for the years from 1970 to 2006. The latter nations
are meant to represent the emerging countries. Whether this is fitting for some
countries like Ecuador, Egypt and Pakistan may be not beyond doubt. I also do not
see why gold is excluded from the reserves considered, especially since some central
banks were active during the period in selling or buying gold. For instance, the
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Swiss National Bank sold more than half of its huge gold reserves in the years after
2000 and distributed the proceeds to the national and cantonal governments.
As a dependent variable Joyce and Razo-Garcia take the “natural logarithm of
international reserves scaled by GDP measured in dollars.” Next they look into the
literature which provided several different explanations for reserve holdings by central
banks: As a precautionary buffer stock for self-insurance against trade, financial and
other shocks; as a consequence of export promotion by an undervalued exchange rate; to
support the financial sector and to prevent unwanted depreciations of the currency. As a
consequence they use in their empirical study (Imports + Exports)/GDP; the Chinn-Ito
index (for financial openness); a dummy variable for fixed or pegged exchange rates; the
deviation from purchasing power parity and M2/GDP for financial development as
explanatory variables. Besides these, control variables like population, GDP per capita
and terms of trade are included.
Their own innovation is, of course, “the inclusion of a country’s IMF quota …
scaled initially by GDP, to determine whether there is an inverse relationship with
foreign exchange reserves.”
Finally period dummy variables are introduced as well as an indicator whether a
country has participated in IMF programs “to determine whether [such] countries…
hold more or fewer reserves.”
In Section 5 a bewildering wealth of results are presented with the help of four
tables, which cannot be repeated here. They are partly contradictory if different sets
of variables are included. But the result that lower quota (Q/GDP) with the IMF are
connected with higher reserves remains significant for middle income countries. “…
the behavior of advanced economies and emerging markets with respect to reserve
holdings diverged after the East Asian crisis of 1997–98. Therefore, we estimate the
model in Table 3 for only the middle income countries in our sample.” In this case
the authors find that “control, precautionary and stability variables generally
continue to be significant.” Moreover, “the argument that middle income economies
hold more reserves in order to maintain an undervalued exchange rate” is confirmed.
Finally it is interesting that participation in IMF programs “has a positive and
significant coefficient in two equations.”
Section 6 ends with some concluding remarks. Here we learn that the IMF has
made its lending arrangements more appealing and increased the access limits. Still,
even the authors conclude that in spite of these changes “It is unlikely … that
emerging markets will significantly reduce their demand for international reserves.”
Indeed, why should they, since according to the authors’ model the marginal costs of
doing so are always higher than those of getting international reserves. Unfortu-
nately, Joyce and Razo-Garcia do not discuss why and under which conditions
countries should borrow at all at the IMF. Obviously, given their assumptions this
should only be the case if their reserves are exhausted and if they are no longer
credit-worthy in international credit markets or have to pay such a risk premium on
interest that it becomes cheaper or inescapable to borrow at the IMF. This means that
only countries which are in a weak economic position would turn for help to the
IMF. Others which undertook successful reforms were and are able to accumulate
sufficient central bank reserves. This means that following Meltzer et al. (2000) the
IMF should concentrate on supporting countries which are hit in a financial crisis by
contagion without their own responsibility.
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More importantly, though the size of quota/GDP turns out to have a negative and
significant influence on reserve holdings, one would have liked a discussion of the
relative size of its influence compared to that of other independent variables. It is
true that the authors have controlled their results by excluding China and obtained
the same results. But still, it is difficult to imagine that quota/GDP should still have
an influence on the further growth of China’s huge reserves which are now by far
surpassing those of the IMF. And for several other countries such a continuing
influence seems also to be doubtful, given the level of reserves they have reached in
recent years.
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